7.2.4.10.3 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) IPSec Examples

The following examples describe how to configure AES and SHA to optimize processing an ESP IPSec frame for maximum performance.

The cipher (or decipher) of an ESP IPSec frame requires both encryption (or decryption) and authentication.

For cipher, the input frame located in the system memory must first be padded and the resulting buffer encrypted. The encrypted frame must be written back to the system memory and sent to the authentication module.

When the AES module is configured to improve the performance of the secure protocol layers (AES_EMR.PLIPEN = 1), the data transfers are simplified, limiting the bandwidth requirements on the system bus.

Before configuring the DMA to start the transfer of the data buffer (input frame) to the AES, the following actions must be taken in registers:

  • AES_BCNT.BCNT must be configured with the length of the message (Input Frame).
  • The padding length of the AES must be configured in AES_EMR.PADLEN. See Automatic Padding Mode to configure Automatic Padding mode.
  • The next header value must be configured in AES_EMR.NHEAD.
  • AES_MR.SMOD and SHA_MR.SMOD must be configured to 2.
    Note: When automatic padding is enabled and AES_MR.SMOD = 2 , AES_MR.DUALBUFF must be cleared.
  • The SHA_MSR.MSGSIZE must be configured with the length of the authentication message including the optional extended sequence number (ESN) and header and trailer information required by the authentication algorithm used (HMAC, etc.). Refer to the section “Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)” for more details on configuration for optimized processing of header information.
  • The Security Parameter Index (SPI, sequence number (SEQ#)) and the optional Initialization Vector (IV) must be configured sequentially in SHA_IDATAR0.
  • A first DMA transfer descriptor must be configured to transfer the input frame from the system memory to the AES input data registers (AES_IDATARx), and a second DMA descriptor must be configured to transfer the encrypted frame from AES to the system memory.
    Note: If AES_EMR.PLIPEN = 1 , there is no need to define a transfer descriptor to load the encrypted frame into the SHA input data registers because the transfer is automatically performed while the second descriptor transfer is in progress.

See the following figures.

Figure 7-14. Generation of an ESP IPSec Frame without ESN

If the optional extended sequence number is required for authentication, wait for the AES-to-system memory DMA buffer transfer to complete before configuring the ESN value. The ESN value must be configured in the SHA by writing sequentially each 32-bit word of the ESN into the SHA_IDATAR0 register. Wait for SHA_ISR.WRDY=1 before each write in the SHA_IDATAR0 register. See the following figure.

Figure 7-15. Generation of an ESP IPSec Frame with ESN

To decipher an ESP IPSec frame without the optional ESN trailer information, two DMA channels are required and the SHA must be configured in Automatic padding mode.

Note: AES automatic padding must be disabled when deciphering a frame.
  • A first DMA transfer descriptor must be configured to load the received encrypted frame from the system memory to AES_IDATARx for decryption. The start address of the first transfer descriptor must be defined after the SPI, SEQ#, and optional IV (see the following figure).
  • A second DMA descriptor must be configured to transfer the decrypted frame from AES_ODATARx to the system memory.
  • AES_EMR.PLIPEN and AES_EMR.PLIPD must be written to ‘1’ so that the data buffer is written in AES_IDATARx and in SHA_IDATARx.

The SHA has the capability to perform an automatic check with an expected integrity check value if this value is appended at the end of the frame buffer (SHA_MR.CHECK=2). Thus, if the first transfer descriptor includes the ICV for SHA, the first DMA transfer allows the decryption and authentication processes including the automatic check. The decrypted part resulting from ICV is not required for downstream processing and must be considered as dummy data.

The end of the decryption and authentication processes occur when flag SHA_ISR.CHECKF=1. The authentication status is provided by SHA_ISR.CHKST.

Figure 7-16. Decryption of an ESP IP Sec Frame without ESN

If the optional ESN trailer information is part of the ICV (see the following figure), the ESN must be manually written into SHA_IDATAR0. The ESN value must be written after completion of the system memory-to-AES DMA buffer transfer. The ESN value must be configured in the SHA by writing sequentially each 32-bit word of the ESN into the SHA_IDATAR0 register. Wait for SHA_ISR.WRDY=1 before each write in the SHA_IDATAR0 register.

When the optional ESN trailer information is part of the ICV, it is not possible to include the ICV received in the input frame to the first transfer descriptor. Moreover, if the HMAC algorithm is used for authentication, no automatic check can be performed when optimizing the processing performances of the SHA module. For more details, refer to the section “Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)”. The result of the HMAC read in the SHA_IODATARx must be manually compared with the ICV value of the input frame. The comparison must be performed after the end of the authentication process. The authentication process is completed when the SHA_ISR.DATRDY flag is set.

Figure 7-17. Decryption of an ESP IPSec Frame with ESN