1.10.4 Security Features
Peripheral | Function | Description | Comments |
---|---|---|---|
TrustZone | Security Enclave | Partition Secure/Non-secure world. | Arm technology. |
Cortex MMU | Memory Management Unit | Cortex-A7 Memory Management Unit. | – |
PIO | I/O Control/ Peripheral Access | When a peripheral is not selected (PIO-controlled), IO lines have no access to the peripheral. | – |
Freeze | Capability to freeze either the functional part or the physical part of the configuration. | Once the freeze command is issued, no modifications to the current configuration are possible. Only a hardware reset allows a change to the configuration. | |
Public Key Coprocessor (CPKCC) and associated Classical Public Key Cryptography Library (CPKCL) | Cryptography | ECC (Asymmetric key algorithm, elliptic curves). | – |
RSA (Asymmetric key algorithm). | |||
TDES, TRNG, AES, SHA | Hardware-accelerated Triple DES. | FIPS-compliant(1) | |
True Random Number Generator. | |||
Hardware-accelerated AES up to 256 bits. | |||
SHA up to 512 and HMAC-SHA. | |||
AES, SHA, CPKCC, CPKLC | Secure Boot | Code encrypted/decrypted, Trusted Code Authentication. |
Hardware AES: Encrypt, Decrypt, CMAC. Hardware SHA. CPKCC, CPKCL: RSA or elliptic curves. |
AES, TDES, SHA, PIT64B, TC | Security and safety analysis and report. | Monitoring on states or sequences, clocks and waveforms. Error detection can occur only in abnormal operating conditions. | – |
Register access protection. | Checks for incorrect accesses. | – | |
AES, TDES | Key clearing on event. | Immediate clearing of the key in case of external tamper event detection | – |
TZAESB | On-the-fly AES. | On-the-fly encryption/decryption for NFC_RAM, DDR, QSPI and SMC memories, with respect to TrustZone using TZAESBASC. | AES128 |
TZAESBASC | Directs data transfer to either the TZAESB secure core or the unsecured TZAESB core. | – | |
Private Key Bus | Transfers hidden keys to crypto-engines. | Capability to transfer keys to or from AES, TZAESB, TDES, TRNG, OTPC in a manner totally invisible by the software. | – |
Memories | Scrambling | On-the-fly scrambling/unscrambling for memories. | SMC, SECURAM, GPBR and QSPI. |
ICM | Memory Integrity Check Monitoring | Uses a hardware Secure Hash Algorithm (up to SHA256). | SMC, DDR, internal SRAM and QSPI . |
SECUMOD | JTAG | JTAG entry monitor | These tampers (JTAG, test, PIOBUs, monitors, etc.) can be configured to immediately erase Backup memories (BUSRAM4KB and BUREG256b) or generate an interrupt or a wakeup signal. |
Test | Test entry monitor | ||
Voltage Monitoring | VBAT monitoring | ||
VDDCPU monitoring | |||
VDDCORE monitoring | |||
Temperature Monitoring | Temperature monitoring | ||
Frequency Monitoring | 32.768 kHz crystal oscillator monitoring. | ||
CPU clock monitoring | |||
IO Tamper Pin | 4 tamper detection pins. Active and Dynamic modes supported. | ||
Secure Backup SRAM (SECURAM) | 5 Kbytes scrambled and non-imprinting avoiding data persistance. | 4 Kbytes erasable on tamper detection | |
Secure Backup Registers | 256-bit register bank, scrambled. | Erasable on tamper detection | |
RTC | RTC | Timestamping of tamper events. Protection against bad configuration (invalid entry for date and time is impossible). | All events are logged in the RTC. Timestamping provides the source of the reset/erase memory/interruption. |
RTC robustness against glitch attack on 32 kHz crystal oscillator. | – | ||
Secure OTP | JTAG Access Control | Disable JTAG access by OTP bit. | – |
Secure Debug Disable | JTAG debug allowed in Normal mode only, not in Secure mode. | TrustZone | |
TZWDT | Watchdog | Protects against TrustZone starvation. | TrustZone |
GPBR | Peripheral Access and Protection. | GPBR can be write protected, read protected and immediately cleared on external tamper event detection. | – |
Physical Unclonable Function | Key Generation | Key creation, derivation, wrapping and management. | Includes NIST SP 800-90B compliant DRNG. |
Note:
- Refer to each peripheral section for details on FIPS compliance.